

Getting Meta: A Multimodal Approach for Detecting Unsafe Conversations within Instagram Direct Messages of Youth

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Instagram, one of the most popular social media platforms among youth, has recently come under scrutiny for potentially being harmful to the safety and well-being of our younger generations. Automated approaches for risk detection may be one way to help mitigate some of these risks if such algorithms are both accurate and contextual to the types of online harms youth face on social media platforms. However, the imminent switch by Instagram to end-to-end encryption for private conversations will limit the type of data that will be available to the platform to detect and mitigate such risks. In this paper, we investigate which indicators are most helpful in automatically detecting risk in Instagram private conversations, with an eye on high-level metadata, which will still be available in the scenario of end-to-end encryption. Toward this end, we collected Instagram data from 172 youth (ages 13-21) and asked them to identify private message conversations that made them feel uncomfortable or unsafe. Our participants risk-flagged 28,725 conversations that contained 4,181,970 direct messages, including textual posts and images. Based on this rich and multimodal dataset, we tested multiple feature sets (metadata, linguistic cues, and image features) and trained classifiers to detect risky conversations. Overall, we found that the metadata features (e.g., conversation length, a proxy for participant engagement) were the best predictors of risky conversations. However, for distinguishing between risk types, the different linguistic and media cues were the best predictors. Based on our findings, we provide design implications for AI risk detection systems in the presence of end-to-end encryption. More broadly, our work contributes to the literature on adolescent online safety by moving toward more robust solutions for risk detection that directly takes into account the lived risk experiences of youth.

Content Warning: *This paper discusses sensitive topics which may be triggering.*

CCS Concepts: • **Human-centered computing** → **Empirical studies in HCI**.

Additional Key Words and Phrases: online risk detection, machine learning, ensemble models, social media, Instagram, end-to-end encryption

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Manuscript submitted to ACM

Manuscript submitted to ACM

ACM Reference Format:

Shiza Ali, Afsaneh Razi, Seunghyun Kim, Ashwaq Alsoubai, Chen Ling, Munmun De Choudhury, Pamela J. Wisniewski, and Gianluca Stringhini. 2023. Getting Meta: A Multimodal Approach for Detecting Unsafe Conversations within Instagram Direct Messages of Youth. *Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact.* 7, CSCW1, Article 132 (April 2023), 30 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3579608>

1 INTRODUCTION

Instagram, a photo and video-sharing social media platform, has grown in popularity among teenagers and young adults. In fact, 72% of Americans aged 18 to 29 say that they use Instagram and at least 71% of them use it once a week [82]. One reason youth like Instagram is that it helps them connect with their friends and the community at large. According to 56% of Instagram users, “the platform makes them feel more connected to the people they know” [95]. Instagram is also a place where people share their lives with their friends and discover more about themselves; however, social media can also facilitate potential abuse, such as malicious users who bully, harass, or sexually groom impressionable youth [86, 118]. Recently, Instagram came under fire after leaked internal research claimed that the parent company Facebook (now Meta) was aware of the site’s negative mental health effects on youth [75]. The claim suggested that the company was aware of the ills of its platforms, such as Instagram’s effect on the mental health and body image of teenage girls. According to Facebook’s internal research, 13.5% of teen girls believe Instagram worsened suicidal thoughts, and 17% believe it contributed to eating disorders [13].

With the surge of malicious actors on social media, researchers in the Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) fields have shifted to automated risk detection being a potential way to address this societal problem; for example, by developing automated approaches to detect cyberbullying [122, 124], suicidal ideation [26], mental health issues [81], sexual solicitations [91] or substance misuse [96]. Researchers developing these automated systems, however, face two main challenges. First, despite the magnitude of hate speech, cyberbullying, and sexual solicitations on Instagram, there is an absence of ecologically valid datasets specific to youth that can help us study and prevent such attacks on youth [15]. Furthermore, there is an over focus on publicly available data [51, 91] rather than private messages which are shown to contain more risky interactions [133]. Further, risk classifiers often do not consider the victim’s account of their own risk experiences [50]; instead, they often rely heavily on third-party annotators to identify risks [91]. We believe that it is critical to evaluate the opinions of youth on their experiences in order to find contextual factors that are relevant for risk detection. Lastly, the vast majority of risk detection algorithms, such as those that detect cyberbullying or harassment, use textual features [64, 107]. However, previous research has shown that risk detection algorithms should include information collected from visuals as well as contextual features to take a Human-Centered Machine Learning (HCML) approach to better detect risk in private conversations on Instagram [2, 20, 51, 91].

Second, communication on Instagram is inherently multimodal (i.e., including images, text, and videos), and therefore adopting a multimodal approach for risk detection is particularly important [20], especially for detecting risk that can be presented in different ways, such as text and images, and also because teens use more image/videos than text based communication [11]. Multimodal machine learning aims to build models that can process and relate information from multiple modalities [9] especially text and images that are very different from one another, thus it has been used to predict popularity of social media photos [46, 70], perform sentiment analysis [66, 105], perform Instagram post analysis [73] and detect false information [38].

105 However, combining information from text and media presents both technical and computational challenges. For
106 example, analyzing multimodal data may not be feasible given Meta’s agenda to move towards end-to-end encryp-
107 tion [14], which will inhibit the use of content-based features for classification, not only for external researchers, but
108 for the platform itself, since the only people able to see end-to-end encrypted content are senders and recipients. In
109 preparation for this shift, it is important for the research community to investigate the feasibility of adopting detection
110 solutions that do not take content into account and are therefore compatible with end-to-end encryption. An example of
111 the features that could be used in this setting is metadata features like the number of messages that are exchanged in a
112 conversation, their inter-arrival time, and the direction of messages (e.g., sent from the perpetrator to the victim or vice
113 versa, as well as the relationship between the victim and perpetrator. In this study, we take a multimodal approach to
114 detect risk in private conversations on Instagram specifically to the domain of youth online risk detection by analyzing
115 metadata, textual, and image-based features that are indicative of conversational patterns and later detecting the risk
116 posit in the conversation to address the following research questions:
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- 120 • **RQ1:** *Can we identify unsafe conversations from safe ones using metadata features - or are linguistic and image*
121 *features necessary?*
- 122 • **RQ2:** *Can we accurately detect the types of risk presented in an unsafe conversation?*
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125 Answering RQ1 is useful to identify promising directions in which risk detection algorithms should move in the face
126 of end-to-end encryption. Answering RQ2 will help researchers and platforms design detection systems that allow
127 to take the specific type of risk into account and adopt appropriate countermeasures. To answer these questions, we
128 collected a dataset of private Instagram conversations from 172 teens and young adults aged 13-21. Our experiments
129 relied on a dataset of 28,725 conversations containing approximately 5 million Instagram private messages. We then
130 created a balanced dataset of randomly chosen safe versus unsafe conversations to train a conversation-level risk
131 ensemble classifier to help us answer RQ1. We tested several machine learning models including Decision Trees, Random
132 Forest, and Linear SVM models and extracted the useful features. We found that while linguistic cues and image features
133 helped in detecting risk when used in ensemble with a metadata classifier (AUC=0.83), metadata features provided an
134 accuracy close to the ensemble (AUC=0.81). This allows us to answer RQ1 affirmatively, showing that in the presence of
135 end-to-end encryption conversation-level characteristics could still allow platforms to detect risk and protect their
136 users.
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140 Next, we developed risk-type classifiers using a multi-class model approach for our three different feature sets
141 for predicting the specific risk type in a given conversation with an accuracy (RQ2). We found that in this case, the
142 contextual information provided by linguistic cues and image features is needed to make an accurate classification
143 (AUC=0.80 using a weighted-vote ensemble). In light of these findings, we discuss design implications for platforms
144 moving towards end-to-end encryption which would limit the ability for any kind of risk detection involving analysis
145 of the actual content of the conversations. In summary, our paper makes the following contributions:
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- 148 • We identified three key feature sets (i.e., metadata, linguistic cues, and image features) that can be used to detect
149 whether a conversation is risky or not for youth. In addition, we designed an ensemble classifier using the
150 different feature sets to predict the types of risks in a private conversation.
- 151 • We highlight that unsafe conversations can be detected by meta-level features based on the conversation
152 structure (i.e., the number of users in the conversation, the length of the conversation, etc.); however, it is
153 critical to consider the content of these conversations (i.e., linguistic and image features) to differentiate between
154 different risk types.
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- We provide design implications for machine learning (ML) approaches, especially in the presence of end-to-end encryption to accurately detect the various types of risks encountered by youth online.

2 RELATED WORK

In this section, we review research on online risks and the need for automated approaches to detect them. Finally, we highlight the contributions of our paper based on the identified research gaps.

2.1 The Online Risks Commonly Encountered by Youth

The rapid expansion of social networking sites among teens has raised awareness of their potential positive and negative effects on youth health and development. There have been public reports of young people being sexually approached and harassed on social networking platforms, putting them at greater risk of sexual victimization [133], as well as reports of cyberbullying [3, 18, 128], violence [39, 92], and exposure to explicit content [57, 59, 74, 76]. The prevalence of unwanted sexual solicitation and exposure to explicit content among youth has also increased, in fact, one in nine youth experience online sexual solicitation [61]. Females are also frequently subjected to unwanted nudity from strangers and struggle with how to decline sexting requests from people they know [42, 43, 90]. Furthermore, cyberbullying has emerged as a potential harm, raising questions regarding its influence on mental health [41]. Hamm et al. found that there is a consistent relationship between cyberbullying and depression among youth. There has also been research on how negative online risk events may cause post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms in teens [68] also while the majority of young people are generally resilient online, a susceptible minority report experiencing various harms as a result of their online activities [33]. Conversations on social media may accelerate harm on vulnerable youth, for example social media may provide a sense of community for deliberate self-harmers and offer supportive advice [31].

All these concerns have been studied in the past, however, these dangers are occasionally investigated together, but more commonly they are investigated separately [130]. We take upon a more holistic approach by first treating “risk” more generally as being any interactions that youth may find uncomfortable or unsafe. Later, we expand on risky conversations and detect different types of risks that youth encounter in their private messages on Instagram.

2.2 The Need for Robust Online Risk Detection and Mitigation

While there is a wealth of research on youth online safety, there is a lack of intervention-based approaches to mitigate online risks [83]. A major line of research in youth online safety has leveraged Artificial Intelligence (AI) based risk prevention interventions for automatically detecting risks such as suicide [24, 60, 93], depression [58, 106], online sexual risks including solicitations and unsolicited exposure [91, 115], and cyberbullying [51]. Yet, most of these AI-based risk detection approaches have been studied without considering the intertwined nature of youth risk experiences, which potentially limits the applicability and reliability of these models in a real-world setting. There is a need for viable solutions that not only empower teenagers to engage with technology, but also remain safe from undue harm. In fact, youth find automated risk detection approaches a promising way to address their online safety concerns [8]. Badillo et al. [8] found that depending on the severity of the risk, children desired varying levels of agency. In most cases, they preferred to solve the problem themselves rather than relying on their parents. Thus, by creating intelligent agents for helping youth cope with online risks, we can promote more resilience-based and self-regulatory approaches for online safety that move beyond parental controls [129] and, we can potentially shift the onus of youth protection from parents to the social media companies that put youth in harms way [15].

2.3 Gaps in Current Automated Approaches for Risk Detection

There has been a myriad of research on detecting online risks, such as hate speech [36, 98], harassment [32], and cyberbullying [19] as well as detecting abusive language [17] in online conversations, particularly in public spaces. However, there are gaps in the current automated approaches for risk detection including lack of user-informed ground truth, emphasis on public over private data, over-focus on textual data or media, rather than both, and focusing on one type of risk rather than looking at risks more holistically [91]. Many studies rely on public datasets and third-party annotators with a lack of human-centeredness in their approaches.

Most of the literature relies on public posts and images for analysis; however, private conversations are very different from those that take place in the public realm. For example, people share different aspects of their life on “stories” on Instagram as compared to what they show on their feeds where anyone can comment publicly [119]. Indeed Parapar et al. [79] presented machine learning approaches to identify suspicious subjects in chat-rooms using a combination of psycho-linguistic, content-based, and chat-based features to detect predation in chatrooms; however, they use publicly available dataset from Perverted Justice (PJ) (a dataset of volunteers acting as teens and convicted sex offenders) to identify predators in these chatrooms. Secondly, this research was not specific to the domain of youth online risk detection. Furthermore, analyzing private social media can provide insight into interplay between user characteristics and sentiments [35]. Gao et al. performed analysis to understand the patterns of textual sentiments and metadata in public and private Facebook posts and concluded that public posts differ significantly, specifically, the texts in public posts are more positive than those in private chats, whereas, in private conversations, people feel more free to express their sentiments.

Secondly, previous research has relied primarily on third-party annotations [91]. For example, Anderson et al. [6] and Miah et al. [71] proposed systems to identify child grooming and child exploitation in online chat conversations. However, research shows that there are low levels of agreement between manual and automated analysis [16] and low levels of agreement between the labeling performed by the researchers and the participants themselves [50]. Such systems lack ecologically valid ground truths, which is why we use annotations done by the participants themselves, adding first-person viewpoints in our detection system.

Lastly, most of the studies on detecting risk in the online space have focused on textual features [91]. However, this approach falls short of addressing the essential question of who is participating in the conversation, messaging frequency, and the media that might be shared in that conversation. For example, Zhang et al. [134] detected early signs of conversation failure. Miah et al. [71] investigated the effectiveness of text classifiers to identify Child Exploitation (CE) in chatting. Text classification has also been used to filter messages for suicide prevention [27]. However, they did not incorporate how media usage, particularly the use of images, can contribute to the overall riskiness of the conversation. It is also crucial to include human-centered elements in such detection systems, such as the relationship of individuals (i.e., our participants) with the people they are conversing with [5]. Ali et al. [2] performed a mixed-method analysis of the media files shared privately in Instagram conversations and established a need to include image features into AI-based risk detection systems.

2.4 The Novelty of Our Approach

In this paper, we present a computational approach to risk detection on a dataset that is not only tailored to youth but also incorporates their own risk perception in private online conversations. We identify and improve on the gaps for an automated risk detection system by utilizing HCML principles [91]. Our study is particularly unique

261 because a) we perform classification on private conversations that were labeled by the participants themselves and b)
262 we utilize a multimodal approach for risk detection using three different feature sets (e.g., metadata, linguistic cues,
263 and image features) to create an ensemble classifier. Our contribution is an end-to-end multimodal approach, which
264 combines multiple heterogeneous modalities (metadata, linguistic cues, and image features) for the detection of unsafe
265 conversations as well as the detection of risk type in the unsafe conversations. To this end, we use stacking ensemble
266 design [34]. Ensemble classifiers often perform better than single classifiers [29]. Ensemble methods provide significant
267 improvement of accuracy compared to individual classifiers [30, 40, 53, 63]. We also investigated which modality is most
268 important for the detection of risk and whether a combined multimodal analysis is beneficial in contrast to monomodal
269 processing.
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273 3 DATASET

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275 This section describes how we collected our data, our risk-flagging practices, and the ethical considerations that guided
276 this work. We also provide an overview of the number of conversations and messages that we collected, together with
277 demographic information about our participants.
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280 3.1 Data Collection

281 To collect data for this study we developed a specialized infrastructure as described in our previous work [89]. We
282 designed a social media data collection system, using a secure web-based system based on Amazon Web Services, RDS,
283 EC2, PHP, Python, and other technologies. To be eligible as a participant, one should meet these requirements; 1) Be an
284 English speaker between 13 to 21 years old based in the US. 2) Maintain an active Instagram account for at least three
285 months throughout their teen years (13-17). 3) Must have at least fifteen Direct Message (DMs) conversations 4) Have
286 at least two conversations with messages that made them feel unsafe or uncomfortable.
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289 Guidelines to be considered eligible were clearly communicated to the participants. Participants were advised that
290 risky encounters may include, but are not limited to, the following categories based on existing teenage online risk
291 literature [130] and user experience on Instagram: Nudity/porn, Sexual messages sexting or solicitations, Harassment,
292 Hate speech, Violence/threat of violence, Sale or promotion of illegal activity, Self-injury, or Other conditions that
293 may cause emotional or physical harm. For eligible participants who are over 18 years old, we asked for an informed
294 consent before the study. For eligible participants who are under 18 years old, we took extra care and obtain informed
295 consent(s) from their parents.
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299 3.2 Data Upload, Risk-Flagging, and Data Verification Process

300 Participants were asked to request their data from Instagram as “.json” files according to General Data Protection
301 Regulation [37]. Then, we asked them to upload their file to our data collection platform as we mentioned earlier.
302 Upon successful upload of data, we presented their chats in a narrative form and required the participants to flag each
303 chat they uploaded as “safe” or “unsafe.” Although we demonstrated the viability of employing predefined risk types,
304 we urged participants to self-assess circumstances in which they feel unsafe or uncomfortable during the message
305 interaction. Further context was also requested for the “unsafe” interactions flagged during the assessment. We used
306 instruction sentences like “describing why the conversations made you or someone else feel uncomfortable or unsafe.”
307 on our user interface of the data collection platform. Uploaded and flagged data was verified by trained researchers
308 once the data was collected. Researchers verified whether the participants are attentive enough to assess their chats by
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checking the length of their completion throughout the flagging process and the realness of the data. Participants who passed the data qualification received a \$50 Amazon gift card as compensation.

3.3 Ethical Considerations

Because our study included participants under 18 years old with private conversations on Instagram, we took extra care to protect the confidentiality and privacy of the participants. Firstly, we obtained a Certificate of Confidentiality issued by the National Institute of Health, which protects participant privacy and prohibits the data from being subpoenaed during the legal discovery process. Secondly, to avoid exchanging information with third parties, we chose not to analyze our data utilizing cloud-based services. Thirdly, we required that the researchers who study the data must complete IRB Human Subjects CITI training and are not permitted to save the data to their personal computers. Moreover, in addition to obtaining IRB approval for our study, we emphasized our federal responsibility to report child pornography to the relevant authorities and offered explicit warnings against sharing digital content depicting a minor’s nudity. Furthermore, our IRB approved child mandated reporting protocol required us to report any sexual explicit image sent to a minor (i.e., under the age of 18) by an identifiable adult, where it was not possible for us to ascertain the age of the conversation partner in these conversations. Additionally, we paraphrased all quotes included in this paper to protect our participants. We believe our efforts to prevent the leakage of this complicated and sensitive data are best practices.

3.4 Data Overview

We aimed to build a comprehensive dataset using a web-based platform, as mentioned in our previous work [89] for youth (ages 13-21) to donate and annotate their Instagram data. To achieve this goal, we reached a large audience of young people in the United States by contacting more than 650 youth organizations and advertising our study on social media (i.e., Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter). We recruited 172 eligible participants with an average age of 16 years old. Our study’s demographic data showed 69% female participants, 23% percent male participants, and 5% non-binary while the rest preferred not to answer. Participants were 41% White, 19% Black/African-American, 16% mixed race, 16% Asian or Pacific Islander, and 8% Hispanic/Latino. Participants came from all around the country, including Florida (12%), California (5%), Indiana (3%), and 28 other states. Participants were predominantly heterosexual or straight (48%) with a few bisexuals (28%) and 11% homosexuals while others decided not to self-identify.

Our participants contributed towards 28,725 chats, including 4,181,970 Instagram private messages. Among these chats, 17,786 of them are flagged as “safe” (15,397) or “unsafe”(3,389). For the 202,613 messages in unsafe chats, 2,947 of them were further flagged by risk type, see Table 1 for the top 5 risk types present in our dataset. Harassment is the most commonly flagged risk type by participants, followed by sexual messages/solicitation.

Table 1. Top 5 risk types annotated by participants

Risk Type	Total Messages	Total Conversations
Harassment	828	507
Sexual messages/solicitation	573	383
Nudity/porn	422	319
Hate speech	152	130
Sale or promotion of illegal activities	144	125

4 METHODS

We now present the key components of an Instagram conversation and the methods used to acquire the multimodal feature sets, and how we developed classifiers to detect different types of risk.

4.1 Characterizing Instagram Conversations

On Instagram, users can have private conversations with their followers/friends as well as strangers. An Instagram conversation comprises of one or more users exchanging messages. These messages can be text or media. We focus on private Instagram conversations because research has shown that the most concerning sexual risks and harassment occur in private, for example in instant messaging and chat rooms [91]. Figure 1 shows an example of a typical Instagram conversation.




Fig. 1. An example of a conversation on Instagram:(1) username of the other person involved, (2) conversation start timestamp, (3) a text message, (4) an image message and, (5) message containing a link.

For the sake of our research we encode Instagram conversations into three components:

- **Metadata:** The recipient(s), i.e., who the message was sent. Number of people involved in the conversation. The length of the conversation (number of messages).
- **Linguistic Cues:** The actual text messages shared in the conversation.
- **Image Features:** Images shared in the conversation.

Then we designed a set of classifiers for each of the feature sets and then combined their verdicts together to obtain a holistic risk detector. We implemented a multimodal approach because one modality might not be able to characterize all types of risks in an Instagram conversations. The combination of visual and textual content builds up most modern communication today, and in this paper, we extend recent advances in risk detection by putting forward a multimodal approach that is able to predict whether a conversation as a whole is safe or unsafe. While the two modalities (text and image) may encode different information [10, 20, 54], adding metadata (including relationship and engagement factors) may further improve the accuracy of the system and therefore can complement each other. Then we detected risky conversations and risk types using our two-step pipeline system, by first detecting whether a conversation is safe or

not, and then further determining for the unsafe conversations as to what risk was associated with them. Thus, we perform binary as well as multi-class classification.

4.2 Binary Classification: Detecting whether a conversation is safe or unsafe (RQ1)

To perform binary classification (that is, categorizing whether a conversation is safe or unsafe), we characterized Instagram conversations using a set of machine learning classifiers, each of which focused on a different set of features (metadata, linguistic cues, and image features) extracted from Instagram conversations. Then, we used the insights derived from this analysis to build an ensemble classifier geared to determine whether a conversation is deemed safe or unsafe. In the next sections, we discuss each feature set in detail:

4.2.1 Metadata. We use metadata features to inspect some prominent user interaction properties, especially in the private realm, to understand users' engagement in safe vs. unsafe conversations. Building upon previous research done on public Instagram posts [10, 21, 73] and chat-based features to detect predation in chatrooms [79], we select user interaction properties such as levels of engagement of people in the conversation, timings, the number of people involved, and average conversation length as key properties of the conversation. Based on previous research, unsafe conversations are significantly shorter and youth tend to disengage when they encounter them [2]. We further these properties by looking at message and image engagement of the participant, their average response times, and the relationship the participant has had with the other persons they are conversing with, to add human centered insights into our model. Table 2 summarizes the features used for our metadata feature set. All metadata features were extracted from the conversation; however, to extract the relationship the participant had with others, we used the participant's own coded data that they provided while labeling their own dataset.

With the increasing adoption of end-to-end encryption by platforms, metadata features can become particularly important in developing risk detection systems, because while content will cease to be available to anyone who is not the sender of the recipient, high-level conversation information will still be visible to the platform. We tested several machine learning models including Decision Trees [103], Random Forest [104], and Linear SVM [104] with the metadata feature set.

Table 2. Metadata features associated with a given conversation.

Metadata Features
Average conversation length, in seconds
The number of users involved in the conversations.
The total number of messages in the conversation.
The total number of images in the conversation.
The total messages sent by the participant
The total messages received by the participant
The total images sent by the participant
The total images received by the participant
The average response time of the participant
The average response time of the other users in the conversations
The relationship the participant had with others

4.2.2 Linguistic Cues. The main way of communicating in private conversations on Instagram is through text messages. Indeed youth use text messages to reinforce existing relationships, both with friends and romantic partners [84, 114].

469 Also, past literature shows that the most commonly used features for risk detection systems in research were textual or
470 lexical features [91]. Therefore, we analyze the linguistic cues to predict whether a given conversation is safe or unsafe.

471 To do this, we employed an end-to-end Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) from the architecture of Kim et al. [52].
472 Based on our previous work [88] on comparing text classifiers (including Linear Support Vector Machine (SVM), Random
473 Forest (RF), and Logistic Regression (LR), and CNN) for sexual risk detection on the same dataset, we found that CNN
474 outperformed the traditional models. This CNN model configuration was optimized by grid search for hyperparameter
475 tuning. As input to this CNN model, we used the Keras Tokenizer Python library¹ to convert conversations to vectors
476 of the tokens. The CNN model architecture is a modified version of the architecture by Collobert et al. [23], including a
477 convolutional layer with multiple filter widths and feature maps, a max-over-time pooling operation [23], and a fully
478 connected layer with dropout and softmax output. To train and assess this classifier, we used the labels specified by our
479 participants.
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482

483 **4.2.3 Images.** Instagram is predominantly an image- and video-sharing platform, which is why focusing on images
484 is crucial. Images are an interesting way to attract people to a conversation and research has shown that youth rely
485 heavily on media to converse [2, 72, 108]. However, some nefarious individuals use social media to spread offensive
486 images and symbols to certain groups of people [28, 49, 56]. As it is relevant how predators can send unsafe/triggering
487 images [62, 109], we next elaborate on how we extracted meaningful information from them. We first divided the images
488 into two sets, photos and screenshots, based on the research findings of Ali et al. [2]. Ali et al. observed that participants
489 often shared screenshots of other conversations with their friends, including screenshots of unsafe conversations that
490 made them uncomfortable. Photos and screenshots provide different information, taking screenshots is a common way
491 of capturing screen content to share it with others or save it for later, for example a conversation, an error on a website,
492 or a meme [99], whereas, a photograph is personal and can be explained using a caption telling who or what is in the
493 image.
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497 We first calculated the number of screenshots shared in a conversation and used this as a feature for the model.
498 Then we employed an Optical Character Recognition (OCR) tool Pytesseract [110] to extract the text from screenshots.
499 It helps to identify and “read” the text embedded in images. For the photos, we used the MSCOCO deep learning
500 model [123], which, given an image, generates a textual caption. The key idea was to train a network that recognizes
501 elements that appear in the images and then generates an adequate caption. MSCOCO has been built using an extensive
502 dataset with over 300,000 images. The output of the system is a meaningful caption of the image given as input. For
503 each image in the conversation, we generated the caption that best represents it.
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506 We extracted the words that are most representative of the images and the screenshots shared in both safe and
507 unsafe conversations by applying Term Frequency/Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) on the captions and OCR
508 text. These captions were extracted to act as a feature of the images shared in safe and unsafe conversations. TF-IDF
509 is a product of two metrics, namely Term Frequency (TF) and Inverse Document Frequency (IDF). We also included
510 another image feature, which was the number of screenshots in the conversation. Our current implementation of the
511 image feature set supports Decision Tree, Random Forest, and Linear Support Vector Machine (SVM).
512

513 We used these three independent feature sets (i.e., metadata, linguistic cues, and image features) to estimate the
514 likelihood of a conversation being unsafe for youth. These are built to operate independently, possibly when a new
515 conversation takes place. Each classifier is designed to model traits from the three aspects of the conversation. Available
516 decisions of all models are later combined to provide one unified output.
517

518 ¹keras - <https://keras.io/api/preprocessing/text/>




Fig. 2. Architecture of our unsafe conversation detection system.

4.2.4 *Ensemble Classifier.* A high-level description of our detection system is presented in Figure 2. We trained our dataset using a set of prediction models $M = (M_1, M_2, M_3)$ that output a probability $M_i(\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n) = P_i[c = unsafe | (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_n)]$ for each conversation c being annotated as unsafe given a feature vector $(\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n)$ obtained from different elements i of the conversation. We refer to these models as *individual classifiers*. Then, we created various ensemble models that combine all predictions in M , where each of the model M_i is weighted by w_i based on the performance obtained. The final classifier outputs a decision based on its voting algorithm.

The goal of the ensemble method is to combine the predictions of the base models. Each classifier individually models the likelihood that a conversation be labeled as unsafe by youth based on its set of features. The ensemble takes all of these judgments (based on metadata, text, and images as described previously) into account to generate a more accurate prediction. This enables for more reliable predictions by having at least one model that is capable of making an informed decision.

Our classifier is based on a stacking ensemble design, which has been shown to outperform individual classifiers [34]. The premise of our stacking design is to use predictions of machine learning models from the previous level as input variables for models on the next level. Our ensemble approach is set up to take a weighted vote from all available predictions. We estimate a function f that takes each of the individual probabilities as input and outputs the aggregated prediction. Formally, $f(P_M, P_T, P_I) = safe, unsafe$.

Majority-Vote Ensemble In this system we gave equal weight to all w_i (i.e. $w_i = 1$) creating an equal vote among the base models. We refer to this non-weighted voting system as *majority-vote*.

Average-Vote Ensemble In the *average-prediction system* we combined each individual prediction using the arithmetic mean of the output probabilities. Note that the parameters in both majority-vote and average-prediction are fixed and do not require calibration. Thus, the validation set is not used in these two modes.

Weighted-Vote Ensemble We define a weighted model as follows:

$$f(M) = \sum w_i \cdot M_i \quad (1)$$

This combines all predictions in M , where each of the model M_i is weighted by w_i based on the accuracy obtained on a validation set. This set is different from the training set, which is used to build the individual probabilities and the testing set, which is used to evaluate the models. To ease presentation, we refer to the model presented in (1) as weighted-vote. This model can be simplified by giving equal weight to all w_i (for example, $w_i = 1$) and obtaining a

nominal value for P_i before voting. The process of weighting the individual predictors also serves as a way to calibrate the output of the probabilities. The final classifier then provides a decision-based output based on its voting algorithm.

4.3 Multi-Class Classification: Detecting the Major Risk Type of a Conversation (RQ2)

After determining whether a conversation is safe or unsafe, we move on to specified risk type(s) in the conversation based on the annotations provided by our participants. The participants annotated the risk in unsafe conversations based on individual messages using the following categories:

- **Nudity/porn:** Images of naked or partly naked people.
- **Sexual messages or Solicitations:** Sending or receiving a sexual communication (“Sexting”).
- **Harassment:** Messages containing credible threats, attempting to humiliate or shame someone, including personal information in order to blackmail or harass someone, or threatening to post nude images of someone.
- **Hate speech:** Messages that incite violence or target individuals based on their ethnicity.
- **Violence/Threat of violence:** Messages, images, or films depicting severe violence, or encouraging violence, or attacking someone based on their religious, ethnic, or sexual heritage.
- **Sale or promotion of illegal activities:** Messages encouraging the use or distribution of illegal substances such as narcotics.
- **Self-injury:** Messages supporting or promoting self-injury, such as suicidal ideation, cutting, and/or eating disorders, are examples of self-injury.
- **Other:** Other situations that could potentially lead to harm as deemed appropriate by the participant.

For this study, we picked the top five most frequently occurring risks in our dataset, i.e., ‘harassment’, ‘sexual messages/solicitation’, ‘nudity/porn’, ‘hate speech’, and ‘sale or promotion of illegal activities’ labeled by the participants. Then we used the same three feature sets i.e., metadata, linguistic cues, and image features that we used for binary classification, to categorize these most prominent risks in the conversation using multi-class detection for each of the conversations. We also used the probabilities obtained from these models to design our ensemble classifier for risk-type detection.

5 RESULTS AND EVALUATION

In this section, we first present the results of the binary-classifiers that predict whether or not a conversation is safe, with a particular focus on whether metadata features can be used in isolation to detect risk (RQ1). Next, we present the results of risk-type classifiers that predict the presence of different risks (i.e., multi-class classifiers) (RQ2). An analysis of the top features that contributed to each classifier’s best accuracy performance (RQ2) is also presented.

5.1 Data Pre-processing

We had a total of 17,786 conversations labeled by the participants as safe or unsafe. Out of these 15,397 were marked as safe conversations whereas 2,389 conversations were unsafe. This distribution is in line with risky interactions’ occurrence in the real world, where we expect the vast majority of conversations to be safe [2, 65]. Training risk detection classifiers on this unbalanced dataset, however, incurs the risk of creating models that predict the class that occurs more frequently in the data set as compared to the other minority class [7], favoring false negatives (i.e., unsafe interactions classified as safe) over false positives (i.e., safe interactions classified as unsafe). Since in this paper we want to understand the most representative features that distinguish risky from non-risky conversations, this imbalance

is not ideal. Moreover, our goal in this formative research is to establish the technical feasibility of building a robust machine learning based detection model, for which a balanced dataset is advisable. For these reasons, we choose to extract a balanced dataset for our experiments. To create a balance between the two classes we randomly selected 2,389 safe conversations, and we used undersampling using random selection of safe conversations as resampling technique for our experiments [97]. For completeness, we also performed experiments on the unbalanced dataset in Section 5.2, and discuss the implications of applying our results in the wild, where safe conversations greatly outnumber unsafe ones, in Section 7.4.

Train, Test, and Validate Splits. We split our datasets into three sets: two for training and tuning parameters of the ensemble (training and validation) and one for testing, and reporting performance metrics on the latter. The total number of conversations in each split is proportionally sampled depending on the less populated class, assigning splits of 60%, 20%, and 20% to the training, validation, and test sets. This procedure is repeated ten times and the results are averaged over the ten different rounds. Table 3 summarizes all settings in our experiments, along with the number of samples used for binary classification.

Table 3. The number of samples used in our experiments for binary risk classification. The sets are balanced as there are the same amount of samples per class (safe samples + unsafe samples).

	Model	Training	Validation	Test
M1	Metadata	2 x 1,433 = 2,866	2 x 478 = 956	2 x 478 = 956
M2	Text	2 x 1,433 = 2,866	2 x 478 = 956	2 x 478 = 956
M3	Image	2 x 1,433 = 2,866	2 x 478 = 956	2 x 478 = 956

We followed the same process for multi-class risk-type detection as well. Each message in the unsafe conversations had been labeled by the participants for *risk-type*. The risk category *Sale or promotion of illegal activities* had the least number of conversations i.e., 125, and therefore we chose 125 random conversations in the rest of the categories as well, summary of our data division for risk-type samples is displayed in 4.

Table 4. Number of samples used in our experiments for multi-class risk-type detection. The sets are balanced as there is the same amount of samples per each class (harassment samples + sexual messages/solicitation samples + nudity/porn samples + hate speech samples + Sale or promotion of illegal activities samples).

	Model	Training	Validation	Test
M1	Metadata	5 x 75 = 375	5 x 25 = 125	5 x 25 = 125
M2	Text	5 x 75 = 375	5 x 25 = 125	5 x 25 = 125
M3	Image	5 x 75 = 375	5 x 25 = 125	5 x 25 = 125

We used the same metadata, text, and image classifiers and finally the ensemble classifiers to perform risk type detection on the conversations as well.

Evaluation Metrics. To evaluate our models, we employed average model accuracy, standard deviation of model accuracy, F1-measure, area under the curve (AUC), as well as class-specific precision and recall. While the accuracy and F1 values offer a broad overview of the models' performance, the precision and recall scores for each class provide more specific information.

5.2 RQ1: Identifying Unsafe Conversations Using Binary Classification

We implemented and evaluated multiple binary-classifiers for detecting unsafe conversations using three different feature sets (i.e., metadata, linguistic cues, and image features). In the following sections, we explain the results of each of the feature sets in detail.

5.2.1 Metadata Classifier: We investigated different models for creating the metadata classifier as explained in Section 4 and have summarized the performance metrics using the metadata features in Table 5. Overall, we found that the Random Forest model outperformed other traditional classifiers with an AUC = 0.81 and accuracy = 0.83. To analyze the effectiveness of each feature as an indicator for whether a conversation is safe or unsafe, we calculated the importance score of each feature.

Feature Selection: We performed a feature selection study to determine the most important features for classification using the metadata classifier. Feature Importance is a score assigned to each feature of a model to determine how much it contributes to the model’s prediction [101]. We examine feature’s importance using Gini importance [102]. The higher the value of importance the more significant the feature is for prediction. We found that “Total Response Time” was the biggest predictor with a score of 0.53, and the next best predictor was the relationship the participant had with the other person(s) (0.11).

Table 5. Classification scores for the task of predicting whether a conversation is safe or unsafe using metadata features.

Model	Class	Prec.	Rec.	F1	AUC	Accr.
Decision Tree	Safe	0.79±0.55	0.66±0.14	0.72±0.39	0.81±0.07	0.81±0.10
	Unsafe	0.73±0.67	0.84±0.16	0.78±0.42		
Random Forest	Safe	0.85±0.14	0.78±0.12	0.81±0.13	0.81±0.05	0.83±0.04
	Unsafe	0.81±0.13	0.87±0.03	0.84±0.02		
Linear SVM	Safe	0.75±0.74	0.70±0.03	0.72±0.64	0.80±0.15	0.83±0.12
	Unsafe	0.76±0.70	0.81±0.04	0.78±0.68		

5.2.2 Text Classifier: We used a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) with 4,778 conversations in total (safe + unsafe) as explained in section 4. Table 6 summarizes the classification scores for the CNN model predicting whether a conversation is safe or unsafe using textual features. Our text classifier gives an accuracy of 0.82 with an AUC of 0.77.

Table 6. Classification scores for the task of predicting whether a conversation is safe or unsafe using text features.

Classifier	Class	Prec.	Rec.	F1	AUC	Accr.
CNN	Safe	0.83±0.61	0.78±0.14	0.81±0.42	0.77±0.12	0.82±0.05
	Unsafe	0.80±0.43	0.84±0.13	0.82±0.22		

5.2.3 Image Classifiers: We built a prediction model based on the features extracted from the captions of the images such that $P_T(X = unsafe)$. The architecture of our system is highly flexible and accepts a wide range of classifiers as explained in section 4. Table 7 summarizes the performance metrics of the different machine learning models. Overall, we found that the Linear SVM model outperformed other traditional classifiers with an AUC = 0.65 and accuracy = 0.70. SVM performs well when the number of samples is substantially more than the number of features. Furthermore,

it is less susceptible to data outliers—rather than decreasing the local error, SVM aims to lower the upper bound on the generalization error [113]. We also found that “Number of Screenshots” shared in a conversation was the biggest predictor with a score of 0.65.

Table 7. Classification scores for the task of predicting whether a conversation is safe or unsafe using image features.

Classifier	Class	Prec.	Rec.	F1	AUC	Accr.
Decision Tree	Safe	0.59±0.74	0.56±0.47	0.52±0.62	0.54±0.17	0.54±0.18
	Unsafe	0.53±0.75	0.54±0.47	0.58±0.64		
Random Forest	Safe	0.67±0.49	0.57±0.32	0.62±0.40	0.54±0.19	0.59±0.20
	Unsafe	0.52±0.54	0.62±0.37	0.67±0.49		
Linear SVM	Safe	0.65±0.01	0.83±0.04	0.73±0.03	0.65±0.04	0.70±0.12
	Unsafe	0.78±0.12	0.57±0.14	0.66±0.15		

Summary of Findings. Looking at these results, we concluded that the metadata classifier works best in detecting unsafe conversations. We found that the metadata classifier detects most of the unsafe conversations accurately (87%), however it misclassified conversations that are longer and whose relationship with the participant is not stranger. On the other hand, for such conversations, the text classifier works efficiently. For example, the use of explicit or abusive words is a sign of riskiness in a conversation that is detected efficiently by the text classifier. These results show that metadata features are the most important information when it comes to detecting risk, and a classifier based upon them can achieve high accuracy. This has important implications in the way in which social media platforms should approach designing risk detection systems that protect user privacy with end-to-end encryption.

Performance Evaluation Using Unbalanced Dataset. While the goal of this paper is to identify important features in distinguishing between safe and unsafe conversations, it is nonetheless important to understand how this real-world imbalance could affect the performance of our system. For this purpose, we used the total 17,786 conversations labeled by the participants containing 15,397 safe conversations and 2,389 unsafe conversations. We trained our models using 60% (10,671 conversations) of the total conversations and tested using 20% of the total conversations (3,557 conversations). The rest of the conversations were used for the validation set. Our results showed that in this setting the accuracy of all models increased, for example the accuracy of the metadata classifier was 0.95 ± 0.03 , text classifier was 0.94 ± 0.12 , while the accuracy of the image classifier was 0.80 ± 0.17 . The F1 score for the metadata classifier in the safe category was 0.73 ± 0.03 and was 0.66 ± 0.12 for the unsafe category. Similarly, the F1 score for the text classifier in the safe category was 0.93 ± 0.01 and was 0.46 ± 0.04 in the unsafe category. Finally, the F1 score for the image classifier in the safe category was 0.83 ± 0.12 and in the unsafe category was 0.57 ± 0.15 . These results show that the F1 scores decrease while using an unbalanced dataset, and the number of false positives and false negatives increase. While analyzing the results manually, we found that the model adapted to the imbalanced case by favoring the majority class (i.e., safe conversations) over the minority one (i.e., unsafe conversations). This is expected in an imbalanced case like this one [7], and it is something that online platform operators like Instagram should consider when deploying similar risk detection models. In Section 7.4 we discuss how this imbalance affects the deployment of similar risk detection systems in the wild.

In Section 7.3 we discuss these design implications in detail. In the next section we show how an ensemble classifier can build upon the different results of the individual classifiers.

5.2.4 *Ensemble Classifier*. Table 8 summarizes the classification scores of the different ensemble classifiers we designed. The best ensemble classifier was the *Weighted-Vote Classifier* with an AUC of 0.83 and Accuracy of 0.85. We show an increase in performance by using the Weighted-Vote Classifier than using the individual classifiers separately. This indicates that putting together the three feature sets gives better results than looking at a single one.

Table 8. Classification scores for the task of predicting whether a conversation is safe or unsafe using different ensemble classifiers.

	Classifier	Class	Prec.	Rec.	F1	AUC	Accr.
E1	Majority-Vote	Safe	0.88±0.14	0.75±0.14	0.81±0.14	0.81±0.13	0.83±0.04
		Unsafe	0.79±0.24	0.90±0.33	0.84±0.28		
E2	Average-Vote	Safe	0.80±0.04	0.79±0.04	0.79±0.04	0.80±0.03	0.80±0.03
		Unsafe	0.80±0.25	0.81±0.34	0.81±0.29		
E3	Weighted-Vote	Safe	0.89±0.06	0.80±0.06	0.74±0.06	0.83±0.06	0.85±0.03
		Unsafe	0.82±0.08	0.90±0.07	0.86±0.07		

5.3 RQ2: Detecting Risk Types in Unsafe Conversations Using Multi-class Classification

Our next step was to check whether we can accurately distinguish the different risk types within unsafe conversations. We aim to understand what kind of indicators work well in detecting different types of risk, and where independent classifiers (i.e., metadata alone) fall short. For this purpose we again divided the conversations into 3 feature sets i.e., metadata, linguistic cues and image features. Table 9 summarizes the results of the classification scores for the task of predicting the types of risk that may be in the conversation. Similar to the binary case, we also test our models on the unbalanced dataset, finding that the accuracy of all the classifiers increases, but with significant increase in the number of false positives for each category.

5.3.1 *Risk Type Analysis*. Next, we manually examine conversations in each risk category to understand which feature set was able to detect what kind of risk more accurately. We identify the different characteristics of each conversation risk type, and our results are as follows:

Harassment: We found that for this risk type the metadata classifier performed better. Most of the conversations containing messages that were labeled as harassment were shorter and participants were less likely to respond to these conversational attacks. Also, almost 70% of these conversations were with strangers.

Sexual messages/solicitation: For this category the text classifier performed better. For these conversations, most of the textual messages contained words that were sexually explicit and focused on asking sexual favors, for example, this message was sent to a 17-year-old male, by another male asking for sexual favors.:

Other: *'Daddy I need your cummies, mine are all in the bank'*

In conversations containing sexual messages/solicitation, the participant engaged occasionally and later stopped engaging. Also, the number of messages sent by the other person was much more than the number of messages sent by the participant themselves, for example, the below message was sent to a 16-year-old female, by a stranger asking for sexual favors. When she refused, they asked/called the participant gay, and the participant then stopped engaging with the said person.

Other: *'I'll fuck the dog shit outa u'*

Table 9. Classification scores for the task of predicting the risk types of unsafe conversations.

	Model	Risk Types	Prec.	Rec.	F1	AUC	Accr.	
833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841	M1	Metadata	harassment	0.85±0.34	0.87±0.12	0.86±0.23	0.71±0.25	0.72±0.23
			sexual messages	0.63±0.34	0.67±0.11	0.65±0.23		
			nudity/porn	0.73±0.33	0.74±0.13	0.73±0.23		
			hate speech	0.65±0.33	0.65±0.14	0.65±0.24		
842 843 844 845	M2	Text	harassment	0.68±0.03	0.65±0.04	0.66±0.04	0.77±0.05	0.79±0.03
			sexual messages	0.86±0.01	0.89±0.01	0.87±0.01		
			nudity/porn	0.77±0.04	0.78±0.02	0.77±0.03		
			hate speech	0.79±0.05	0.79±0.04	0.79±0.05		
846 847 848 849 850	M3	Image	harassment	0.53±0.34	0.57±0.10	0.55±0.22	0.64±0.29	0.66±0.24
			sexual messages	0.67±0.33	0.68±0.14	0.67±0.24		
			nudity/porn	0.88±0.36	0.72±0.12	0.79±0.24		
			hate speech	0.69±0.35	0.76±0.13	0.72±0.24		
851 852 853 854 855	E1	Majority Vote	harassment	0.65±0.24	0.63±0.24	0.64±0.24	0.71±0.34	0.72±0.25
			sexual messages	0.79±0.21	0.79±0.21	0.79±0.21		
			nudity/porn	0.75±0.26	0.77±0.31	0.76±0.27		
			hate speech	0.74±0.29	0.75±0.43	0.74±0.31		
856 857 858 859 860	E2	Average Vote	harassment	0.65±0.11	0.63±0.15	0.64±0.13	0.71±0.23	0.70±0.16
			sexual messages	0.69±0.22	0.65±0.12	0.67±0.17		
			nudity/porn	0.75±0.22	0.78±0.22	0.76±0.22		
			hate speech	0.71±0.14	0.69±0.10	0.70±0.12		
861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878	E3	Weighted Vote	harassment	0.79±0.02	0.79±0.04	0.79±0.03	0.80±0.13	0.82±0.05
			sexual messages	0.85±0.02	0.88±0.02	0.86±0.02		
			nudity/porn	0.82±0.04	0.78±0.03	0.80±0.04		
			hate speech	0.78±0.05	0.82±0.04	0.80±0.05		
		sale of illegal activities	0.85±0.11	0.82±0.08	0.83±0.10			

Nudity/porn: For this category, the image and metadata classifiers performed best. On manual inspection, we found that a number of suspicious links were shared in these conversations, mostly pornographic websites. Also, the participants themselves hardly participated in such conversations (very few messages by the participant themselves). For example, in one of the group conversations, a “dick pic” was shared, while the participant did not send any message. *Hate speech:* For hate speech, we found that the text and metadata classifier worked best. Approximately 60% of these conversations were mostly with acquaintances and friends (i.e., people the participants knew- online or offline). For example, the conversation snippet below was part of a group conversation where a participant (aged 17, female) tried to convey their message logically, but was later slut shamed due to an unfortunate typo.

Participant: ‘Okay first of all women are not combat ready. That’s why there’s no woman soldiers that are currently fighting. They aren’t physically capable of fighting men. They can’t compete in male sports hoe do u expect them to fight in war?’

Other: ‘Since you don’t seem to understand that your a hoe I guess I’ll just call you a thot’

In these types of conversations, the participant tried to correct/put forward their opinion but later ended the conversation, when they realized that they were being bullied. For example, in this conversation the participant (aged 16, female) tried to correct the other person but later stopped replying due to their harsh response:

Other: *'Rot in hell'*

Participant: *'Stop. She apologized and so did I so you need to drop it.'*

Other: *'You trick as bitch'*

Sale or promotion of illegal activities For sales and promotion of illegal activities we found that the text classifier worked better. For most of these conversations, the participants pointed out that the messages were from someone whose account was hacked. The participants reported concern that these types of messages made them extremely uncomfortable, for example, a participant (aged 17, male) was sent the following message:

Other: *'[participant name] OMG your actually on here, [removed username] , your number 15! its really messed up'*

In most of these conversations monetary advantage in the form of money or gift card was promised to the participant, for example:

Other: *'[participant name] you won't believe this! I just received a \$1,000 GiftCardVisa yesterday and all I did was participate a little and they actually sent me it. I used it to get a new phone I have been eyeing LOL!! I thought u would want one also since your my follower. Hurry tho theres only a few of them left! Click'*

A lot of these messages were trying to give rewards to participants for following them or taking other actions such as clicking on links. for example:

Other: *'Hi! Here is your code ####-@@@-**** I'll send the last four digits but first follow EVERYONE I follow! Once you did message me back what type of giftcard you'd want! Also let me know the value on the giftcard :)'*

Other: *'Congratulations!!! Taylor Swift Has Chosen You To Be Among Our Latest Winners, You Have Won \$10,000.00 In the Covid19 Assistance Fans Promo. Your Name Has Been Shortlisted, You Are Truly Lucky And Thank You For Being A Fan.'*

Overall, we presented the results of the individual metadata, text, and image classifiers and the ensemble approach of the combination of those classifiers. The weighted-Vote performed the best for classifying safe/unsafe conversations and also the risk type.

6 ERROR ANALYSIS OF MISCLASSIFICATIONS IN RQ1

In this section, we examine individual prediction cases to gain a better understanding of the factors that lead to misclassifications by our individual binary classifiers and those that could only be detected using the Ensemble Classifier. We looked more closely at each model and qualitatively examine the characteristics of the unsafe conversations that were correctly detected by the model specifically but not by others. We discuss our qualitative observations below.

6.1 Correctly Identifying Conversations Using Individual Feature Sets

Each feature set provides us with different information about the conversation, for example, metadata features provide details regarding participants' interest in the conversations and who they are conversing with. Linguistic cues, and

image features provide details about what the conversation is about. In the following sections, we provide examples of conversations where one feature set triumphed over the other and instances where the others failed.

6.1.1 *Correctly Classified by Metadata, Misclassified by Linguistic Cues, and Image Features.* We determined that the metadata classifier was able to detect 87% of all unsafe conversations. Upon manual analysis of the unsafe conversations detected by the metadata classifier, we saw that they were shorter and that the participant stopped engaging with other(s). Below, we share two examples of conversation snippets correctly detected by the metadata classifier but misclassified by the text and image classifiers:

Other: 'Where are you staying at?'

...

Other: 'Oh fr that's what's up. I'm here till Saturday you should come meet me at the beach one day or somethin'

Participant: 'Sweet but I have practice tomorrow and Saturday aha are you just here for vacay.'

...

Other: 'You have a snapchat?'

In this conversation, a 19 year old female was harassed by a stranger who kept asking for her Snapchat ID and her location. The participant engaged very less in the beginning and then stopped engaging abruptly. The conversation was short (total 12 messages), and was initiated by the other person. Furthermore, no media files were shared in this conversation. The text classifier also failed to detect this classifier because the language used was not predatory.

Other: 'A contact named the group My hot photos!'

Other: [Instagram User sent an attachment.]

This was a short group conversation in which the participant (aged 19, gender female) was randomly added by a stranger. The participant did not engage in this conversation, and all messages were sent by other people in the group. In this conversation, one link possibly to a pornography website was also shared, however, no image files were shared in the said conversation.

Most of the conversations detected using the metadata feature set had the unique characteristic of being short (avg 20 messages) and 37% of these conversations were group conversations with 76% of these conversations being with strangers.

6.1.2 *Correctly Classified by Linguistic Features, Misclassified by Metadata and Image Features.* Our text classifier was particularly helpful in detecting conversations that are longer, and contain highly sexual and offensive language. Below we share two examples of conversations correctly detected using linguistic cues, but were not detected using the metadata and image feature sets.

Other 1: 'you're invalid'

Other 1: 'i said validate me you queer'

Other 2: 'finna sass the fuck out of [name]'

Participant: 'Would you please stop it!!!'

Other 1: 'your dick get broke'

This was a group conversation where the LGBTQIA+ community was targeted. Here the participant (age = 17, gender = male), actively participated, however, tried to call out the toxic behavior of his peers. The relationship as stated by

the participant himself was friends. Interestingly, some of the accounts involved in this conversation were marked as deleted. The conversation was demeaning towards women and the LGBTQIA+ community, using sexual and explicit language.

Other: *'Hey I have a foot fetish and I was wondering if you could send me pictures of your feet'*

Other: *'Are you there'*

Other: *'I don't have any money right now is there anything I can do to get feet pictures for free'*

Participant: *'Just google feet pics'*

Other: *'I would but your way hotter then the girls'*

In this conversation, the participant aged 20, female, was asked for private pictures, i.e., “feet pics” in exchange for money that they would send at a later date. The participant denied to give any such favors, but the other person was persistent. Interestingly, no media files were exchanged in this conversation but the participant also did not quit engaging with the other person.

As can be seen from these examples, conversations that are longer, with more textual context are detected by the text classifier, however, since these conversations do not contain images and are usually with a person(s) whom the participant knows, therefore they were misclassified by the metadata and image classifiers.

6.1.3 Correctly Classified by Image Features, Misclassified by Metadata and Linguistic Cues. Most of the conversations that were correctly classified by image features and misclassified by metadata and text classifier contained suggestive images with females in them. We share an example of such a conversation:

Other: *[Shared picture]*

Other: *'Because I got through your picture and see something in you'*

Other: *'You are beautiful like the angels in heaven'*

Participant: *'You have stop this okay'*

Other: *'Am falling in love with you'*

Participant: *'i have a boyfriend'*

Other: *'Is he going to Mary you'*

Other: *'send me his picture'*

...

In this conversation, the participant aged 17, gender female was harassed by the other person, by showing her personal picture containing a clothed female showing some cleavage and asking for sexual favors. She replied that she had a boyfriend and he needed to stop messaging her. The participant also mentioned that she was a minor and later went on to block the other person.

The image feature set was helpful in identifying unsafe conversations that shared images of people, for example, selfies of females. The conversations had varied lengths.

6.2 Correctly Identifying Conversations Using Weighted Ensemble Classifier

Some of the conversations were only detected using the Weighted Ensemble Classifier, using the probabilities of all three classifiers (metadata, linguistic cues, and image features). For example, the following conversations were detected only using the weighted ensemble model:

1041 *Other: 'All lives matter'*

1042 *Participant: 'all lives can't matter until black lives matter'*

1043 *Other: 'So your saying my life doesn't matter'*

1044 *Participant: 'are you white ?'*

1045 *Other: 'Yeah'*

1046 *Participant: 'exactly . your life already matter s'*

1047
1048
1049 In this conversation, the participant aged 15, female was trying to convince the other person, of the importance of
1050 the “Black Lives Matter”(BLM) movement, whereas the other person was trying to argue back that all lives matter and
1051 BLM implies that their life doesn't matter since they are white. The other person left the conversation themselves.
1052

1053 *Other: 'Please watch that. I hope you get help for your gender dysphoria'*

1054 *Other: [Send Video]*

1055
1056 In this conversation, the participant (aged 14, gender unspecified) was being harassed due to being transgender, by a
1057 stranger. The other person sent her a video link asking her to watch it to “fix her gender dysphoria”. The participant
1058 did not engage in this conversation and blocked them.
1059

1060 Our Weighted Ensemble Classifier helped detect most of the unsafe conversations, especially those in which ‘risk’ is
1061 not visible directly, but were labeled by the participant as unsafe. Since it uses the probabilities from all three feature
1062 sets (metadata, linguistic cues, and image features) it was able to identify all the nuances of unsafe conversations.
1063

1064 7 DISCUSSION

1065
1066 In this paper, we presented a systematic approach to the detection of unsafe conversations on Instagram encountered
1067 by youth. With the impending push toward end-to-end encryption on Meta platforms, we make the important finding
1068 that meta-level data inferred from conversational patterns can be used to detect risks in conversation-level data. This is
1069 an important implication for risk detection and the accountability of social media platforms to protect users, even if
1070 end-to-end encryption is implemented. However, if these platforms want to take the extra step of mitigating online
1071 risks, they may be limited in being able to respond to specific risk types appropriately without contextual information
1072 about the type of risk users are encountering. To dig deeper into the specific risk of the conversation we needed to
1073 look at other features such as linguistic cues and image features. Therefore, this may be a reason for Meta and other
1074 social media companies to reconsider the push towards end-to-end encryption as it limits their ability to protect users,
1075 particularly young people, from harms that are committed on their platforms. Below, we discuss the human-centered
1076 insights and limitations for deploying our system into the real world.
1077
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1079

1080 7.1 Meta-level Data as a Key Risk Indicator (RQ1)

1081
1082 Our analysis highlighted that risky conversations, regardless of risk type, presented similar high level characteristics.
1083 Compared to safe conversations, risky conversations are shorter and more one sided, as victims tend to disengage early
1084 on in the conversation. This is in line with Ali et al.'s finding when analyzing meta data and media files on Instagram [2],
1085 as well as with research that studied conversational patterns and interactions in online fraud [44] and spam [48].
1086 However, our results go beyond these prior studies to show that meta-level data is a *better* predictor of conversational-
1087 level risk than contextual data contained within the messages themselves. Our metadata classifier used features that
1088 were directly available from the conversation, except for the relationship the participant had with the person they
1089 were conversing with, which may be inferred from topography of the social network (e.g., reciprocal connection,
1090
1091
1092

1093 unidirectional following, or no connection). Based on our feature selection study, metadata features such as engagement
1094 of the participants and the response time of participants are key features that can be used to distinguish between
1095 conversations that made the users uncomfortable or otherwise. Other features, like the history of the other people
1096 involved or whether they were suspended previously for malicious activity, can be useful. However, this information is
1097 accessible only to the platform. For our study, we used data directly annotated by the participants; however, companies
1098 like Meta could extract similar features from profile-level characteristics of users, as well as through social network
1099 analysis.
1100

1101
1102 Overall, our findings open up interesting opportunities for future research and implications for the industry as a
1103 whole. First, performing risk detection based on metadata features alone allows for lightweight detection methods
1104 that do not require the expensive computation involved in analyzing text and images. Second, developing systems
1105 that do not analyze content eases some of the privacy and ethical issues that arise in this space [12, 69], ensuring user
1106 protection. This can also potentially enable the creation of privacy-preserving datasets to be used to train risk detection
1107 systems, where the data shared only contains metadata (e.g., anonymous IDs of who sent a message, timestamps, etc.).
1108 Finally, with the switch of online platforms like Meta to end-to-end encryption, analyzing metadata is a promising way
1109 in which social media platforms could detect risk without intruding on their users' privacy.
1110
1111

1112 **7.2 Additional Context is Needed for Determining Risk Type and Designing Appropriate Intervention** 1113 **Strategies (RQ2)**

1114
1115 While metadata helps distinguishing risky from safe conversations, our findings indicate that these high level features
1116 are not nuanced enough to distinguish between different risk types. To detect the specific type of risk involved in a
1117 conversation, the information provided by linguistic cues and image data is paramount. In particular, we found that
1118 some kinds of risk, such as sexual messages/solicitation and sales or promotion of illegal activities are easier to detect
1119 using textual features, while risks such as nudity/porn can be better detected using image features. A notable exception
1120 is harassment, where the repetitive and one-sided nature of communication was consistently enough to distinguish it
1121 from other types of risk, and this can be effectively detected through metadata features. These findings have several
1122 implications for future research. First, our work highlights the importance of existing NLP and computer vision work in
1123 detecting online risk [78, 94, 100]. While these techniques are more heavyweight than metadata ones, they are necessary
1124 in performing fine-grained risk detection. An opportunity in this space would be combining the two approaches, using
1125 metadata as a first layer filter for all conversations and applying deeper (and more expensive) textual and image analysis
1126 only to those conversations that are flagged as suspicious by the metadata filter. This type of multi-level approach has
1127 been successfully used in other security and safety contexts, like spam detection [85, 112] This approach would enable
1128 more effective defenses, especially for risk types where context is important to make decisions on how or when to
1129 intervene.
1130
1131

1132
1133 Secondly, risk mitigation especially for youth requires a user-centered and tailored approach in order for it to be
1134 successful [1, 4, 131]. Risk prevention programs, in general, are more effective when tailored to context [121], which is
1135 why we use contextual information. For example, the relationship a participant had with the other person is an important
1136 context to determine whether a conversation is risky. Metadata can provide high-level cues about conversations that
1137 are unsafe for youth; however, the detection and response to the specific type of risk require the use of linguistic cues
1138 and image data. This finding raises important philosophical and ethical questions in light of Meta's recent push towards
1139 end-to-end encryption as such contextual cues would be useful for well-designed risk mitigation systems that leverage
1140 AI. We discuss these implications in more detail in the next section.
1141
1142

7.3 Implications for the Design of AI Risk Detection Systems

The cybersecurity and safety communities have highlighted the inherent trade-off between privacy and security, which has been studied and discussed for years [132]. Many online platforms are pushing towards adopting end-to-end encryption for their messaging services: applications such as Telegram, Meest, Signal, Line, and WhatsApp have end-to-end encryption enabled and implemented, allowing users to communicate more securely [55]. The purported benefit of end-to-end encryption is increased user privacy. With end-to-end encryption, messages are encrypted by the sender and decrypted by the receiver; and therefore, the platform is unable to see what content is being exchanged. Since end-to-end encryption allows only the sender and receiver to view the message's contents it is considered to be one of the most effective ways to ensure security of the content [126]. While this practice may dramatically improve user privacy [22], it also limits what platforms can do with respect to detecting risky content exchanged in conversations [14]. For instance, textual and image features cannot be leveraged for the detection of risk in unsafe conversations, as we have demonstrated is possible in this paper. It is in this way that enhanced end user privacy through end-to-end encryption could act as a double-edged sword that can hide abuse, protect malicious users, and create safety issues for more vulnerable users [67, 117, 120]. Thus, balancing end user privacy and safety becomes a complex problem, especially when dealing with vulnerable users, such as minors [125].

Meta, the parent company of Instagram, is also moving towards building and implementing end-to-end encryption across Messenger and Instagram DMs [25]. In fact, Meta has been involved in an on-going political and legal struggle over the use of end-to-end encryption on its services, with a special emphasis on child protection. The UK Home Secretary Priti Patel has organized an international effort to persuade Meta to abandon plans to integrate its messaging applications and encrypt all user conversations, claiming that such plans make it more difficult to protect minors [45]. The main criticism from parties interested in employing encryption to keep messages secure is that any weakening of encryption for the advantage of third-parties also aids those with more sinister purposes. For instance, they believe that allowing law enforcement access through a "backdoor" creates a vulnerability in security systems that criminals can exploit [77]. The unintended consequence providing a built-in way to access private information can also be used by cybercriminals to exploit children, commit acts of terrorism, or perpetrate human trafficking [111]. Conversely, end-to-end encryption could also serve to protect cybercriminals when committing these heinous acts and prevent critical evidentiary data from being discovered during legal proceedings if they are caught [127].

And, when it comes to the ability for the platform itself to take an active role in youth risk prevention, there remains additional considerations. While many social media platforms and researchers are exploring the use of improved parental controls [47] and the use of age verification [80], using AI risk detection to mitigate some of the harms youth are exposed to in real-time can also be advantageous. However, with end-to-end encryption becoming widespread, researchers and platforms might have to adapt their detection mechanisms to use features that are still available in this setting. Our results highlight that metadata only features, which respect user privacy by not revealing any sensitive information, are in many cases effective in distinguishing safe conversations from unsafe ones on Instagram. These findings can be used as a guideline by platforms when designing AI risk detection systems: based on the level of granularity at which they wish to detect user risk and on the level of privacy that they want to guarantee to their users, platforms can choose to based their detection on high-level features such as the metadata ones or perform more heavyweight and privacy-invasive analysis.

As such, our results lead to important considerations for the design of AI risk detection systems in light of the industry-wide push towards end-to-end encryption. One design recommendation could be to give users (or parents)

1197 the option to turn on end-to-end encryption and/or risk detection, so that they can negotiate the trade-offs between
1198 privacy [87] and safety themselves. Another option would be to take a “Child Safety by Design” [116] approach of
1199 requiring social media companies at a policy-level to include safeguards for minors, which may preclude them from using
1200 end-to-end encryption. Alternatively, our work demonstrates the potential for AI systems to develop meta-level data
1201 risk detection as a way to create some safeguards for youth while allowing for privacy protection through end-to-end
1202 encryption. As such, companies that opt to move toward end-to-end encryption still have viable options for developing
1203 AI-driven safeguards for youth within their platforms, rather than absolving themselves of the responsibility for youth
1204 protection.
1205
1206

1207 7.4 Limitations & Future Research

1208 The findings of this study highlight the need to improve the overall quality and accuracy of risk detection systems,
1209 with significant implications for using various feature sets (for example, metadata, linguistic cues, and image features)
1210 for risk prevention and intervention, particularly in the private realm on social media. The dataset we employed for
1211 our study is modest sized ($N = 172$) and considers data from Instagram alone. Furthermore, our data set is complex
1212 and exhibits considerable variations due to its multimodal nature. For this reason, we utilize a multimodal approach
1213 to risk detection. Metadata, linguistic cues, and image features represent different sources of information, which can
1214 suggest different information. Our method allows each of the modalities to provide individual predictions, without
1215 the interference of the other, which are then merged using an ensemble model to get a final prediction. Secondly, as
1216 researchers collecting this data, there were certain metadata level characteristics that we could not examine, such as the
1217 length of an account, the activity, and their previous history, for example, whether or not they harassed somebody in
1218 the past or were reported/suspended. These additional features can be used by companies like Meta to further risk
1219 mitigation especially by partnering with researchers these indicators can be explored in more depth for the purpose of
1220 protecting users on the platform.
1221

1222 The system we present is a key first step in developing automated tools that are able to assist both social media
1223 companies and end users identify conversations that make youth uncomfortable. However, there are risks in deploying
1224 such automated systems, principally the risk of labeling safe conversations as unsafe. If we want a more strict clas-
1225 sification of unsafe conversations, it may cause some safe conversations to be marked as unsafe, causing users to be
1226 frustrated and may end up denying the service to legitimate users. Another potential risk of an incorrect detection
1227 is that it reduces the responsiveness of such a tool, causing users to disregard them altogether. Our system is more
1228 inclined towards detecting as many unsafe conversations as possible, given that our target audience is youth and young
1229 adults. For our best working ensemble classifier, i.e., *Weighted-Vote*, we saw the highest recall for unsafe conversations.
1230 It reached the highest performance and was able to identify the most number of unsafe conversations (90%). For our
1231 target audience, i.e., young adults and youth we believe it is necessary to detect all risky conversations even if we
1232 may need some stricter measures. Therefore, having high recall is more important, because for our case it is okay to
1233 classify a safe conversation as unsafe (false positive) and alerting the participant involved, but it is critical not to miss
1234 identifying risky conversations (false negative).
1235

1236 To be able to elicit the most representative features that distinguish safe from unsafe conversations, we balanced
1237 our dataset. However, when applying our approach in the wild online platform operators would have to deal with an
1238 unbalanced dataset where safe conversations far outnumber unsafe ones. Our experiments showed that when training
1239 and testing a classifier on an imbalanced dataset the overall accuracy increases, but the fraction of false positives for
1240 the safe category also increases, with a decrease in the F1 score. This is not ideal, as generating too many unjustified
1241

warnings would make users ignore them. Online platforms should develop strategies to deal with this. For example, they could use our automated system to flag potentially risky conversations and have a human moderator make the final decision. Lastly, there is always a chance of predators or malicious users changing their behaviors so as to bypass the system. From the previous section, we saw that there are some distinct metadata characteristics of risky conversations such as lack of participant engagement, shorter conversations and lesser images being shared in conversations which can be bypassed by malicious users or scammers by deliberately engaging the participant more and sharing images in such conversations. However our system relies on a wide range of features that are more difficult to evade, such as linguistic cues which analyze the actual content of the conversation.

Our analysis provides an important first step to enable automated (machine learning based) detection of online risk behavior going forward. Our system is based on reactive characteristics of the conversation however our research also paves the way for more proactive approaches to risk detection which are likely to be more translatable in the real world given their rich ecological validity. Since the conversations that we studied are actually annotated by the participants themselves, we can extrapolate the key points from this research to proactive risk detection to other datasets on other platforms too that show similar trajectories.

8 CONCLUSION

In this study, we employed several feature sets to detect multimodal risk in private Instagram interactions. We found that features based on metadata information work well when used to develop risk classifiers, and this type of features could be used by platforms to developing risk detection systems when textual and image information becomes unavailable due to the adoption of end-to-end encryption. We then focused on detecting the specific type or risk in conversations, and found that in this case the contextual information provided by text and images is key to develop accurate classifiers. This work can inform future research on developing risk detection systems by both the CSCW community and the platforms themselves.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research is supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation under grants #IIP-1827700, #IIS-1844881, #CNS-1942610 and by the William T. Grant Foundation grant #187941. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the research sponsors. We would also like to thank all the participants who donated their data and contributed towards our research.

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1539 Received July 2022; revised October 2022; accepted January 2023

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